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SHORTCUT:


 

Economic Games and Mechanisms to Address Climate Change

May 04, 2009 to May 06, 2009
Organized By: Rene Carmona (Princeton), Prajit Dutta (Columbia), Chris Jones (University of North Carolina), Roy Radner (NYU), and David Zetland (UC Berkeley).
 
Participant List:
View a List of Registered Participants
 
Mathematical models of bargaining games can suggest strategies and even equilibria, but they do not necessarily predict actual outcomes. To explore the relationship of theoretical and applied models of bargaining, we will consider feedback approaches that begin with theory, test theory under experimental conditions (where participants negotiate in conditions under incentives present in the theory), and update theory to reflect deviations between predicted and theoretical results. Such approaches are more-likely to produce robust designs for mechanisms to address climate change that can be utilized in the 2009 Kyoto negotiations.

Market mechanisms have been touted by many economists as the most efficient process to reduce externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions. The European Union has implemented such a mechanism known as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). However, the EU ETS has been criticized in the public press and in congressional hearings for the failure of the implementation of its first phase. Indeed, it has demonstrated the possible shortcomings of cap-and-trade schemes: missing the emissions reduction targets, collapse of allowance prices and significant (some will even say obscene) windfall profits for the energy companies involved.

Since most countries are contemplating mandatory cap-and-trade schemes to address CO2 emissions (e.g. Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the next president of the US has a cap-and-trade scheme on his energy/environmental platform) it is of the utmost importance to understand the economic consequences of the design of a cap-and-trade scheme. The workshop will bring together economists, policy makers, mathematicians, and industrial leaders to address these issues in a rigorous scientific manner.

Accommodations:

A block of rooms has been reserved at the Rose Garden Inn. Reservations may be made by calling 1-800-992-9005 OR directly on their website. Click on Corporate at the bottom of the screen and when prompted enter code MATH (this code is not case sensitive). By using this code a new calendar will appear and will show MSRI rate on all room types available.
The cut-off date for reservations is April 17, 2009.

A block of rooms has been reserved at the Hotel Durant. Please mention the workshop name and reference the following code when making reservations via phone, fax or e-mail ONLY: 0905ECONOM. The cut-off date for reservations is April 3, 2009. Room Rate $139/ night.


 

Follow this link to read about the new U.S. visa requirements

 

Schedule

Monday May 4, 2009

09:00AM - 09:40AM  Rene Carmona Cap-and-Trade Market Models, Tutorial I    (See Abstract)
09:45AM - 10:25AM  Rene Carmona Cap-and-Trade Market Models, tutorial II
10:30AM - 11:00AM  Tea, Coffee in the atrium
11:00AM - 11:40AM  Michael Ludkovski Optimal Switching to play Games with the Environment    (See Abstract)
11:45AM - 12:25PM  Suzanne Scotchmers "Cap and Trade: The problem of diffusion"
12:30PM - 02:00PM  Lunch
02:00PM - 02:40PM  James Bushnell (TBA)
02:45PM - 03:25PM  Ronnie Sircar Differential Games and Exhaustible Resources
03:30PM - 04:00PM  tea, Coffee in the atrium
04:00PM - 05:30PM  Panel Discussion: Market Mechanisms as Solutions of Green House Gas Emissions: Interaction between Policy Makers, Economists and Mathematicians. (what will the Role of Mathematics be?)
07:00PM - 09:00PM  The Roda Theatre in downtown Berkeley: The Math Behind the Cath: the Inside Story of Stents, Pacemakers, and other Medical Miracles

Tuesday May 5, 2009

09:00AM - 09:40AM  Prajit Dutta Game Theory and Climate Treaties, Tutorial I    (See Abstract)
09:45AM - 10:25AM  Prajit Dutta Game Theory and Climate Treaties, Tutorial II
10:30AM - 11:00AM  Tea, Coffee in the atrium
11:00AM - 12:00PM  Robert Pindyck Uncertainty, Extreme Outcomes, and Climate Change Policy.    (See Abstract)
12:30PM - 02:00PM  Lunch
02:00PM - 02:30PM  Svetlana Pevnitskaya An Experimental Investigation of Economic Incentives in Environmental Conservation, Sustainability and Renewable Energy    (See Abstract)
02:30PM - 03:00PM  Katerina Sherstyuk Games with Dynamic Externalities and Climate Change Experiments    (See Abstract)
03:00PM - 03:30PM  Bard Harstad The Dynamics of Climate Agreements    (See Abstract)
03:30PM - 04:00PM  Tea, Coffee in the atrium
04:00PM - 05:30PM  David Zetland Discussion: Climate change dynamics in theory, experiments and reality
05:30PM - 07:00PM  Reception in the Atrium

Wednesday May 6, 2009

09:00AM - 09:55AM  Max Auffhammer TBD
10:00AM - 10:30AM  Tea, Coffee inthe atrium
10:30AM - 12:00PM  Richard Gilman,  David Housman,  David Mond,  Stephen Schecter Panel Discussion: Game theory in the math curriculum (motivated by climate change!)    (See Abstract)
12:00PM - 01:30PM  Lunch
01:30PM - 03:00PM  Final discussion and future planning.

Currently Available Videos

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