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# Hiding Quantum Data

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Cast: Charles Bennett..... Hagrid  
David DiVincenzo..... Han Solo  
*Patrick Hayden..... Narrator*  
Debbie Leung..... Hermione  
Peter Shor..... Dumbledore  
Barbara Terhal..... Princess Leia  
Andreas Winter..... Harry Potter

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An IBM-IQI-MSRI-AT&T Production

# Overview

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- Act I



- LOCC data hiding for quantum states  
(quant-ph/0207147)

- Act II




- From RSP to PQC to data hiding

*A few years ago in  
a lab moderately  
far away...*

# Nonlocality without entanglement

$$\langle \phi_i \psi_i | \phi_j \psi_j \rangle = \delta_{ij}$$




Not always possible:  $|\phi_i\rangle$

	0	1	2
0	±		±
1	±		±
2		±	

# Quantum data hiding

GOAL: Charlie hides a bit from Alice and Bob, secure against LOCC




RESULT: There exist bipartite  $n$ -qubit states hiding a bit with security  $2^{-(n-1)}$ .

# Hiding a qubit: First attempt

TASK: Hide an arbitrary quantum state  $|\varphi\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$

$$\langle \zeta_i | \zeta_j \rangle = \delta_{ij}$$




Prepare superpositions of well hidden states?

# Hiding a qubit: First attempt

TASK: Hide an arbitrary quantum state  $|\varphi\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$


$$\langle \zeta_i | \zeta_j \rangle = \delta_{ij}$$



PROBLEM: Data hiding with pure states is impossible!  
(So much for superpositions.)

# 2nd simplest idea

THE PLAN: Use classical hidden bits as key to randomize a qubit

$$E(\varphi) = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=0}^3 \rho_i^{AB_1} \otimes \sigma_i \varphi \sigma_i^{B_2}$$


PROPERTIES: 1)  $\varphi$  can be recovered using quantum communication  
2) Naïve attacks fail ( $AB_1$  to find key then rotate  $B_2$ )

PROBLEM: Alice and Bob can attack  $AB_1B_2$



# Actually, *not* a problem

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Any method to learn about  $\varphi$  by LOCC will provide a method to defeat the original cbit hiding scheme.

Will argue the contrapositive:

Assume there is an LOCC operation  $L$  (with output on Bob's system alone) and two input states to the hiding map  $E$  such that

$$L(E(\varphi_0)) \neq L(E(\varphi_1))$$

# Minor algebra

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$$\begin{aligned} L(E(\varphi)) &= L\left(\frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=0}^3 \rho_i^{AB_1} \otimes \sigma_i \varphi \sigma_i^{B_2}\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=0}^3 L_i(\sigma_i \varphi \sigma_i), \quad \text{where } L_i(\omega) = L(\rho_i^{AB_1} \otimes \omega^{B_2}) \end{aligned}$$


**CLAIM:** Not all  $L_i$  can be the same TPCP map. If they were, then by linearity:

$$L(E(\varphi)) = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=0}^3 L_0(\sigma_i \varphi \sigma_i) = L_0\left(\frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=0}^3 \sigma_i \varphi \sigma_i\right) = L_0\left(\frac{1}{2} I\right)$$

This says that  $L$  would never reveal any information about the input state, violating the hypothesis that  $L$  defeats the qubit hiding scheme.

# Defeating the cbit hiding

Conclusion from previous slide: there is a  $k$  such that  $L_0 \neq L_k$



$$\left( L \otimes I_{B_3} \right) \left( \rho_i^{AB_1} \otimes \Phi_+^{B_2 B_3} \right) = \left( L_i \otimes I_{B_3} \right) \left( \Phi_+^{B_2 B_3} \right)$$

- The attack:
- 1) Bob prepares a local maximally entangled state on  $B_2 B_3$
  - 2) Alice and Bob apply  $L$  to  $AB_1 B_2$
  - 3) Bob performs a measurement on  $B_2 B_3$

By Choi, there is a measurement that can partially distinguish  $L_0$  and  $L_k$

# Imperfect hiding

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Wish to limit distinguishability through LOCC:

$$\|L(E(\varphi_0)) - L(E(\varphi_1))\|_1 < \varepsilon$$


For all input states and attacks.

If the original  $2n$  bit hiding scheme has security  $\delta$ ,  
then  $\varepsilon < 2^{n+1} \delta$ .

Not so bad: security of classical hiding schemes *appears*  
to improve exponentially with number of qubits used.

# Multipartite cbit hiding


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- With LOCC alone the five parties cannot learn  $i$
- *Authorized sets* can recover the secret using quantum communication


All monotonic access structures are possible: [Eggeling, Werner 2002]

# Multipartite qubit hiding



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
# Multipartite qubit hiding



- With LOCC alone the five parties cannot learn  $\varphi$
- *Authorized sets* can recover the secret using quantum communication

Problem for generalizing construction: B must be in all authorized sets

# Quantum secret sharing




Secure against quantum communication in unauthorized sets but secret can be recovered by quantum communication in authorized sets.

- ✓ All monotonic threshold schemes not violating no-cloning [CGL,1999]
- ✓ All monotonic schemes not violating no-cloning [G,2000]



# Hiding distributed quantum data



Resulting state provides strengthening of quantum secret sharing:

- Secure against classical communication between all parties
- Secure against quantum communication in unauthorized sets
- Secret can be recovered only by quantum communication in authorized sets.

✓ All monotonic schemes not violating no-cloning

# Act II





Fig. 1: Glimpse of a master magician's workshop


# Remote state preparation: Non-oblivious teleportation

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A circuit that needs no introduction:




# Remote state preparation: Non-oblivious teleportation



Result discussed Sunday: probabilistic, exact RSP of high-dimensional states is possible using 1 ebit + 1 cbit + 1 rbit per qubit.

# From RSP to randomization

Circuit for teleportation:




Before receiving  $i$ , Bob knows nothing:  $\frac{1}{4^n} \sum_i U_i \varphi U_i^* = \frac{1}{2^n} I$

(“Private quantum channel”, “Quantum one-time pad”, etc.)


# Private quantum channels

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# From RSP to randomization

Circuit for teleportation:




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# From RSP to randomization

Circuit for remote state preparation:



Before receiving  $i$ , Bob knows nothing:  $\frac{1}{2^{n+o(n)}} \sum_i U_i \varphi U_i^* \approx \frac{1}{2^n} I$

(“Private quantum channel”, “Quantum one-time pad”, etc.)



# On the meaning of “ $\approx$ ”

For any probability density  $P(\varphi)$  on states in  $C^d$  and  $\varepsilon > 0$  there exists a choice of unitaries  $\{U_s\}$ ,  $s=1, \dots, S$  such that

$$\int dP(\varphi) \left\| \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^S U_s \varphi U_s^* - \frac{1}{d} I \right\|_1 < \varepsilon$$

and

$$\log S = \log d + o(\log \log d) + \log \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2} \right)$$

Compare to the perfect private quantum channel:  
To achieve  $\varepsilon=0$  requires  $\log M = 2 \log d$ .

# Another version

There exists a choice of unitaries  $\{U_{ps}\}$ ,  $p=1,\dots,P$ ,  $s=1,\dots,S$  such that for all states  $\varphi$  in  $C^d$


$$\left\| \frac{1}{P} \sum_{p=1}^P |p\rangle\langle p| \otimes \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^S U_{ps} \varphi U_{ps}^* - \frac{1}{Pd} I \right\|_1 < \varepsilon$$

and

$$\log P = \log S = \log d + o(\log \log d) + \log \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2} \right)$$

Can randomize *every* n-qubit state using 1 secret random bit and 1 public random bit per qubit.

# A stronger version of randomization



$R$  is a good randomizer if it destroys all correlations with the outside world:

A pink line starts from the left and points towards the equation below.

$$(I \otimes R)\rho^{AB} \approx \rho^A \otimes \frac{1}{d} I$$

For separable inputs, this follows from previous formulation.  
Not true for entangled inputs!

# Rank argument

Recall good randomizing map:

$$T : B(\mathbb{C}^d) \rightarrow B(\mathbb{C}^P \otimes \mathbb{C}^d)$$
$$\varphi \rightsquigarrow \frac{1}{P} \sum_{p=1}^P |p\rangle\langle p| \otimes \frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^S U_{ps} \varphi U_{ps}^*$$

Randomizing condition:  $T(\varphi) \approx \frac{1}{P} I \otimes \frac{1}{d} I$


Act on half of a maximally entangled state:

$$(T \otimes I)(\Phi_d) \text{ has rank around } P \cdot d$$

Fidelity with maximally mixed state small:  $F((T \otimes I)\Phi_d, \frac{1}{Pdd} I) \lesssim \frac{1}{d}$

# Characterizing leftover correlations


What does randomization map do to entangled inputs?



- Charlie prepares maximally entangled state  $k$  then randomizes it.
- Bob performs a complete projective measurement.

# Characterizing leftover correlations

What does randomization map do to entangled inputs?



- Charlie prepares maximally entangled state  $k$  then randomizes it.
- Bob performs a complete projective measurement.

Conclusion: the randomizing map is secure against 1-way LOCC

# (Highly optimistic) Conjecture

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Can randomize *every*  $n$ -qubit state using 1 secret random bit per qubit and *no public random bits*.

Given  $\varepsilon > 0$ , there exists a choice of unitaries  $\{U_s\}$ ,  $s=1, \dots, S$  such that for all states  $\varphi$  in  $\mathbb{C}^d$

$$\frac{1}{S} \sum_{s=1}^S U_s \varphi U_s^* \in \left[ \frac{1-\varepsilon}{d} I, \frac{1+\varepsilon}{d} I \right]$$

and

$$\log S = \log d + o(\log d) + \log \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2} \right)$$


# Consequences

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- Universal remote state preparation with only 1 ebit + 1 cbit per qubit
  - (No shared random bits necessary)
- Weakly randomized maximally entangled states indistinguishable from maximally mixed states using LOCC
  - (Not just 1-way LOCC as sketched earlier)



# Application to data hiding







Consider ensemble of randomized states with  $V$  chosen using Haar measure

$$\begin{aligned}\chi &= \log(d^2) - \int dV S((RV \otimes I)\Phi) \\ &\geq \log(d^2) - \log M \quad \leftarrow \text{Rank bound on entropy} \\ &= \log d - o(\log d) - \log\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}\right)\end{aligned}$$

So we can do coding to get about  $n$  hidden bits using  $n \times n$  bipartite states!

# Glyph collection



# Competing visions

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- Faction 1

- Destroying classical correlations requires only 1 rbit per qubit
- Destroying quantum correlations requires 2 rbits per qubit

- Faction 2

- Randomizing an arbitrary pure quantum state requires 1 public rbit and 1 secret rbit per qubit

# Summary

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- Described a method for hiding qubits given one for hiding bits (construction and proof not restricted to data hiding)
- Outlined a connection between LOCC data hiding, private quantum channels and remote state preparation